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I. Introduction
The supplanting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) has been roundly applauded.1  In particular, 
commentators consider the changes in dispute settlement away from a diplomatic model 
and towards a more judicial, rules-based model to be positive ones.  Interestingly 
however, while the new dispute settlement system is commanding a high level of respect 
and legitimacy – as reflected by the dramatic increase in cases brought when compared 
with the GATT era  – panelists and Appellate Body members have been very cautious in 
issuing their opinions.  Specifically, the decision-makers appear to be going to great pains 
to present the appearance of unanimity – even where unanimity does not actually exist.  
In 120 panel decisions to date, there have been only six dissents.  And of the 76 Appellate 
Body decisions to date, there has been only a single opinion styled as a dissent, and one 
other separate opinion labeled a concurrence.2 Even though there are provisions in the 
WTO rules expressly permitting panelists and Appellate B ody members to put forth 
differing opinions, WTO jurists are overwhelmingly declining to do so.  The fact that 
WTO disputes have been resolved almost entirely without dissenting opinions has 
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1
 The WTO came into effect as of January 1, 1995.  See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
2
 The term “dissent” is used here to mean “the explicit disagreement of one or more judges of a court with 
the decision passed by the majority.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 472 (6th ed. 1990).  A concurrence is 
used  here to indicate an opinion in which the a judge agrees with the conclusions or results reached by the 
majority, but provides different reasoning or views in reaching the same result.  See id. at 291.  For ease of 
reading, this article generally uses the term “dissent” to refer to the writing of a separate opinion, be it in 
actuality a dissent or concurrence.  However, when specific dispute settlement cases are discussed, the 
terms “dissent” and “concurrence” are used consistent with the actual opinions.
2garnered little scholarly attention.3  This Article explores the issue in detail by examin ing
the lack of dissent in WTO jurisprudence and concluding that the seeming unanimity of 
the decisions should be a cause for concern rather than celebration.  Keeping the lid on 
dissents may ultimately erode the strength of the dispute settlement system and hinder the 
ability of the WTO Members to make appropriate changes to the Agreements.  Part II sets 
forth the relevant dispute settlement understanding provisions, discusses the empirical 
evidence thus far with respect to panel and Appellate Body reports, and considers the 
WTO experience in the context of other international adjudicatory tribunals.  Part III
examines factors that may explain why there has been so little dissent in WTO dispute 
resolution.  Part IV identifies the positive and negative functions dissents can serve. Part 
V addresses whether the lack of dissent should be a cause for concern in the WTO 
context, determining that the WTO may ultimately suffer if it does not adopt a more open 
approach towards differing opinions.  Part VI concludes by considering ways the WTO 
might reform the DSU or its internal practices such that dissents would not be so heavily 
discouraged.
II. The Dispute Settlement Understanding and Experience
This section introduces the WTO dispute settlement structure and the relevant 
WTO rules pertaining to the form dispute settlement decisions should take.  It then 
3
 The issue is occasionally mentioned in passing but has yet to be explored in depth.  See, e.g., James 
McCall Smith, WTO Dispute Settlement: The Politics of Procedure in Appellate Body Rulings, 2 WORLD 
TRADE REV. 65, 81 (2003) (stating that “isolated anonymous dissents have been included in WTO panel 
reports” but only citing to the EC-Poultry panel report, WT/DS69/R (March 12, 1998); John Greenwald, 
WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law Legislation?  6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 113, 123 n.18 
(2003) (discussing the Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products case substantively and, in noting its 
dissent was unusual, stating that “I fear it [this dissent] will die of loneliness.”  Former members of the 
Appellate Body have provided some insights into the lack of dissent, but again have not examined the issue 
comprehensively.  See, e.g., Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO, 6 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 695 (2003); James Bacchus, Symposium Address: The Role of Lawyers in the WTO, 34 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 953, 960 (2001).
3examines the incidence of dissents and separate opinions in WTO jurisprudence, and 
compares the WTO experience with that of other international judicial bodies. 
A. From Diplomatic to Legalistic: The Evolution of the DSU
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) and the results of the 
disputes resolved under the DSU thus far can best be appreciated by recalling the 
differences between the current and former systems of dispute resolution.  Under the 
GATT, disputes were resolved through recourse to three-member panels.  There was no 
appellate review of panel reports, but a given report only bound the parties to the dispute 
if there was a consensus of all GATT members to adopt that report.  In other words, the 
losing party to a dispute had the power to veto adoption of a report not decided in its 
favor.  The GATT system can thus be characterized as diplomatic in nature, in that it 
relied upon consensus and agreement of the parties for rulings to have any impact.  The 
diplomatic nature of the dispute settlement system led to some notable instances of 
diplomatic breakdown in which losing countries elected to veto the adoption of reports 
against them.4  The lack of certainty that GATT dispute settlement reports would be 
adopted was considered a major drawback to the system, and countries brought relatively 
few of their disputes before GATT panels.5
In the Uruguay Round, Members elected to abandon the diplomatic style of 
dispute resolution used in the GATT era and instead drafted and adopted the DSU, which 
sets forth a far more procedural, rules-based system for resolving members’ disputes.  In 
4 Examples include the reports in the United States’s complaint against the EC with respect to subsidies on 
exports of wheat flour; the United States’s complaint against the EC on subsidies for pasta product exports; 
and a Swedish complaint against the United States with respect to antidumping duties on stainless steel 
pipes.  The adoption of each of these reports was blocked repeatedly by the losing party.
5
 Between 1947 and 1994 approximately one hundred GATT panel reports were adopted.  The total number 
of disputes brought slightly exceeded this figure, as some reports were not adopted due to the opposition of 
the losing party.  However, the total was well under two hundred.  A list of the adopted GATT reports is 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm (last accessed April 17, 2006).
4particular, the Members changed the consensus rule to a reverse consensus system by 
which dispute settlement reports are automatically adopted unless there is a consensus not 
to adopt them.  In other words, a report will be adopted unless the winner of the dispute 
agrees that it should not be.  In addition, a level of appellate review was incorporated, in 
the form of a new Appellate Body.  These more legalistic innovations have been widely 
viewed as significant improvements over the GATT system.6 Members appear to be 
pleased with the changes, as they are using the dispute settlement system much more 
actively than in the GATT era.  Approximately three hundred separate disputes have been 
initiated before the WTO in the last eleven years, far more than were brought in the entire 
forty-seven year history of the GATT.
In a further shift away from the diplomatic and towards the legalistic approach, 
the DSU sets forth a variety of procedural requirements to be followed in WTO disputes 
at both the panel and Appellate Body level.  In addition, the Appellate Body has adopted 
its own set of working procedures.  Both the DSU and the Appellate Body’s Working 
Procedures contain provisions reflecting a desire for consensus-based decision-making.
B. DSU and Appellate Body Working Procedures P rovisions
Although the Dispute Settlement Understanding and Appellate Body Working 
Procedures each discuss separate opinions, the Working Procedures provide more 
6
 The dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO have been hailed as one of the most successful elements 
of the organization.  Much has been written on the basic features of and differences between GATT and 
WTO dispute settlement.  Useful sources include DAVID PALMETER AND PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d ed Cambridge 2004); 
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (particularly Part III) (Oxford 2003); ERNST-
ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1997); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE (1999); and William J. Davey, The WTO 
Dispute Settlement System, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM 145-74 (Gary P. Sampson and 
W. Bradnee Chambers eds. 2002).
5detailed guidance.  The Dispute Settlement Understanding merely provides that 
“[o]pinions expressed in the panel report by individual panelists shall be anonymous”
(Article 14.3)7  and that “opinions expressed in the Appellate Body report by individuals 
serving on the Appellate Body shall be anonymous” (Article 17.11).8  This language 
makes clear that separate opinions are permitted at both the panel and Appellate Body 
level, albeit anonymously, but does not seem to impart a sense of disapprobation towards 
the practice of writing separately.9
In contrast, the Appellate Body Working Procedures reflect a strong desire to 
reach unified decisions if at all possible: “The Appellate Body and its divisions shall 
make every effort to take their decisions by consensus.  Where, nevertheless, a decision 
cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue will be decided by a majority vote”
(Rule 3.2).10  The Working Procedures do not elaborate upon Article 17.11 of the DSU to 
provide any further guidance on how or whether a minority view can be expressed. And 
in practice, the Appellate Body has taken unmistakable steps to avoid dissenting 
opinions.11  As such, “the spirit of Rule 3.2 first sentence of the Working Procedure has 
clearly prevailed over the possibility offered by Article 17.11 DSU.”12
In theory then, panel and Appellate Body members are free to express 
disagreement with a majority opinion.  In practice, however, WTO jurists have generally
7
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments – Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] Art. 14.3.
8
 DSU Art 17.11.
9 The issue of anonymity is discussed infra in Part III.
10
 Working Procedures Rule 3.2 (emphasis added).
11 See infra Part III.
12 Ehlermann, supra note 3, at 697 (noting that as of 2003, in only one case had member of the Appellate 
Body expressed an anonymous concurrent opinion).
6declined to exercise this option.13  The following section documents the magnitude of this 
disconnect at both the panel and Appellate Body level.
C. Lack of Dissents: the Empirical Evidence 
Since the WTO’s inception, less than five percent of panel reports and less than 
two percent of Appellate Body reports have included dissenting opinions.  Specifically, to 
date there have been only six dissents out of one hundred-twenty panel reports.14  Those
dissents occurred in the following cases: 1) European Communities – Measures 
Concerning Importation of Certain Poultry Products;15 2) U.S. – Import Measures on 
Certain Products from the European Communities;16 3) United States – Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany ;17 4) 
European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries;18 5) United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood 
Lumber from Canada;19 and 6) United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for 
Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”).20
There have been even fewer dissents at the Appellate Body level.  Out of seventy-
six reports21 there has been only one dissent, in the recent Upland Cotton Subsidies 
13 One is reminded of the Clash song “Know Your Rights” (“you have the right to free speech, as long as 
long as you’re not dumb enough to actually try it.”).
14 As of April 12, 2006.
15 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Importation of Certain Poultry Products, 
¶¶ 289-93, WT/DS69/R (March 12, 1998) [hereinafter “EC – Poultry”].
16 Panel Report, United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, 
WT/DS165/R (July 17, 2000) [hereinafter “U.S. – Certain EC Products”].
17 Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from Germany, WT/DS213/R (July 3, 2002) [hereinafter “U.S. – German Steel CVDs”].
18 Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing 
Countries, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter “EC – Tariff Preferences”].
19
 Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada , 
WT/DS264/R (April 13, 2004) [hereinafter “U.S. – Final Lumber AD Determination”].  
20 Panel Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins, 
WT/DS294/R (Oct. 31, 2005) [hereinafter “U.S. – Zeroing of Dumping Margins”].
21
 As of April 12, 2006.
7case,22 and one concurring opinion, in the European Communities – Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (“EC – Asbestos”) case.23
D. How does the WTO Experience Compare to Other International 
Tribunals?
The lack of dissent in WTO dispute resolution is no accident.  Instead, it reflects a 
concerted effort on the part of the members of the Appellate Body to reach consensus 
whenever possible.  This effort may appear incongruous given that dispute resolution 
based on consensus was essentially rejected in the formation of the WTO, and in fact it 
may reflect an attempt to hold onto one of the diplomatic aspects of GATT dispute 
resolution.24 The incidence of dissents in WTO dispute resolution is low, as a percentage 
of disputes heard,25 but the lack of dissents is especially striking when compared with the
practices of other international judicial bodies.  This section examines the experiences of 
other international tribunals and demonstrates that the WTO experience is not 
representative of international tribunals as a whole.
22
 Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (March 3, 2005) 
¶¶ 631-641 (out of 763 paragraphs).
23
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (March 12, 2001).  See also Ehlermann, supra note 3, at 698 n.3; Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the ‘World Trade Court’ in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEM 1995-2003 499, 508 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Federico Ortino, eds., 2004) (“None of the 
reports is accompanied by a dissenting opinion.  In only one case [EC – Asbestos] has a member of the 
Appellate Body expressed an anonymous concurrent opinion.”).
24
 As discussed supra, under the GATT, the losing party to a dispute could block the adoption of the panel 
report against it.  Under the WTO, this is no longer possible.  Instead, panel reports are adopted unless there 
is unanimous consensus against adoption.
25 At the Appellate Body level there has been only one dissent out of seventy-odd cases, or less than two 
percent of the time.  Even when the one concurring opinion is accounted for, the incidence of separate 
opinions is still under three percent.  Similarly, fewer than five percent of panel reports have included 
separate opinions of any kind.
8It can be challenging to define what precisely qualifies as an international judicial 
body,26 and many entities could be so characterized.27 This article does not attempt to 
examine all possible international tribunals as comparative reference points.  Instead, it 
examines the experience of the adjudicatory bodies with the widest membership – namely 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS).  In addition, this section additionally looks at the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) dispute settlement tribunals because the nature of the 
disputes heard in NAFTA dispute settlement are very similar to those resolved by WTO 
dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body. 28
1. The International Court of Justice 
The ICJ is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations.  Any of the Member 
States of the United Nations (at present 191 members) may bring disputes before the 
26 New York University’s Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT) has prepared a synoptic 
chart to illustrate which tribunals might qualify. See http://www.pict-
pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/Synop_C4.pdf.  (last accessed April 17, 2006).  
27 In connection with PICT, Cesare P.R. Romano has, in a very helpful article, attempted to define which 
entities should be considered international judicial bodies.  See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of 
International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709, 711-23 (1999).  
For further information on PICT see http://www.pict-pcti.org/index.html (last accessed April 17, 2006). 
PICT defines international judicial bodies as those that meet the following five criteria: (1) permanent 
institution; (2) composed of independent judges; (3) adjudicate disputes between parties at least one of 
which is a state or international organization; (4) follow pre-determined procedural rules; and (5) issue 
decisions which are legally binding.  See JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-
MAKERS 458 (Oxford 2005).
28 A number of the other entitles identified as international judicial bodies by Romano (supra note 27, at 
715-17) permit dissents, including the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR); the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACHR); the Central American Court of Justice (CACJ); the Common Court of 
Justice and Arbitration of the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (for 
arbitrations); and the Judicial Board of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, with 
some, particularly the ECHR, experiencing frequent dissents.  The ECHR provision permitting dissents is 
worded considerably more neutrally than Rule 3.2 of the Appellate Body Working Procedures: “if a 
judgment does not represent, in whole or in part, the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be 
entitled to deliver a separate opinion.” See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, amended by protocol No. 11, May 11, 1994, art. 
45(2)) Europ. T.S. No. 155 (entered into force November 1, 1998) [hereinafter European Convention], 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf (last visited March 5, 2006).  For a 
helpful discussion of European regional tribunals see Carl Baudenbacher, Judicialization: Can the 
European Model be Exported to Other Parts of the World?, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 381 (2004).
9ICJ.29 Dissents are permitted and occur frequently in the ICJ.  The ICJ has been 
criticized for having ideological factions amongst its judges, a factor that has 
undoubtedly led to a high level of dissent.30
2. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
At present there are 149 State parties to the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, the Convention for which ITLOS resolves disputes.31  Dissents are 
permitted in ITLOS decisions, and this right has been exercised vigorously.  In fact, there 
have been separate or dissenting opinions in every ITLOS disputes for which a decision
has been issued.32
3. NAFTA
Under NAFTA, different panels are constituted to hear different types of disputes.  
So-called Chapter 20 panels resolve all disputes except those relating to investment33 or 
to antidumping and countervailing duty matters.  Chapter 20 panels may issue separate 
opinions but must, as in WTO dispute settlement, be anonymous.34 Chapter 19 panels 
resolve antidumping and countervailing duty disputes.  Their reports also may contain 
concurrences and dissents.35 The NAFTA Chapter 19 and Chapter 20 panels, unlike the 
WTO panels, have exercised their right to issue separate or dissenting opinions.  In 14 of 
29 See http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (last accessed April 17, 2006).
30
 Debra P. Steger, Improvements and Reforms of the WTO Appellate Body, in THE WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003 41, 45 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Federico Ortino, eds., 2004).
31 See http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last accessed April 17, 2006).
32
 ITLOS has been the subject of some criticism for precisely this reason.  See, e.g., Donald M. McRae, The 
WTO in International Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 27, 39 (2000).
33
 NAFTA investment disputes are covered in Chapter 11 of the Agreement, which provides that investor-
State disputes can be resolved through various arbitral mechanisms such as ICSID and UNCITRAL.  
Investor disputes are not resolved by dispute settlement panels as are Chapter 19 and Chapter 20 disputes, 
and as such are not considered here.
34 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 & 32 I.L.M. 605 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) (hereinafter NAFTA) arts. 2016(3), 2017(2).
35
 NAFTA Annex 1901.2.  Chapter 19 and Chapter 20 disputes are resolved by five-member panels.  
Panelists are selected from a roster of up to 30 individuals.  Roster members are appointed by consensus for 
terms of up to three years and may subsequently be reappointed.  See NAFTA art. 2009.
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51 cases to date there have been separate or dissenting opinions from the decisions 
issued.
The experience of the ICJ, ITLOS, and NAFTA would seem to suggest that the 
WTO’s high rate of unanimous decisions is the exception rather than the rule in 
international dispute resolution.  The political nature of the ICJ and to some extent 
ITLOS cases may be one reason why those tribunals experience a much higher rate of 
dissent.  The NAFTA tribunals however resolve disputes quite similar to many of the 
WTO’s disputes.  Perhaps then there are factors unique to the WTO that explain its 
unusually high level of consensus.
III. Potential Explanations for the Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Resolution
This Section explores why there has been so little dissent in WTO dispute 
resolution.  While there are many possible explanations, it seems certain that the reason 
cannot be attributed to happenstance or chance.  Instead, it is quite clear, particularly in 
the Appellate Body, that separate opinions have been discouraged to a significant degree.
The Appellate Body appears to be motivated by a variety of factors to discourage 
dissents.  In addition, there may be procedural and institutional factors increasing the 
likelihood of unanimous decisions.
A. Dissent is Actively Discouraged
The original members of the Appellate Body made a conscious decision to avoid 
dissent, which is reflected in their Working Procedures.  It appears that the divisions of 
the Appellate Body have taken to heart their task to “make every effort to take their 
11
decisions by consensus.”36 James Bacchus, former Chairman of the Appellate Body, has 
explained that:  
Whatever our individual role may be in any particular appeal, 
each of us strives always to reach a ‘consensus’ in every appeal.  
We are not required to do so.  The treaty does not prohibit 
dissents….the ‘consensus’ we have achieved in the many appeals 
that have been made, thus far, to the Appellate Body has not 
always been achieved easily…37
The apologetic language used by the dissenter in the Upland Cotton case conveys 
the author’s discomfort with writing separately.  First, rather than styling the differing 
view as a “dissent” the author instead stated that: “[o]ne member of the Division hearing 
this appeal wishes to set out a brief separate opinion.”38 However, in substance the 
opinion is clearly a dissent rather than a concurrence.  The member then went to great 
pains to highlight his or her39 agreement with the Report as a whole: “At the outset, I 
would like to make it absolutely clear that I agree with the findings and conclusions and 
reasoning set out in all preceding Sections of this Report, but one, namely, Section C 
above … It is only on the interpretation of Article 10.2 that I must respectfully 
disagree.”40 The dissenter bends over backwards to limit the scope of the disagreement 
and emphasize agreement in all other areas.  Within the dissent, the author uses the first 
person numerous times (such as “this suggests to me”) which further heightens the sense 
that the author recognizes he or she has gone out on a lonely limb in order to speak 
separately.
36
 Working Procedures Rule 3.2.
37 James Bacchus, Table Talk: Around the Table of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 
35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1021, 1029-30 (2002).
38
 Consistent with DSU Art. 17.11 the author of the “separate opinion” is not identified.
39
 Merit Janow (United States) was the presiding member.  She was joined by Luiz Olavo Baptista (Brazil) 
and A.V. Ganesan (India).
40
 Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 631, WT/DS267/AB/R  (March 3, 
2005). 
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The Working Procedures and the Cotton dissent reflect the Appellate Body’s 
desire to avoid dissent.  What requires further scrutiny to determine is, why is unanimity 
such a high priority for the Appellate Body and dispute settlement panels?
1. Desire for Legitimacy
The primary reason the dispute settlement jurists have emphasized consensus 
appears to be out of a desire for legitimacy and a belief that speaking as one voice will 
prove their independence.  Former Appellate Body Member Claus-Dieter Ehlermann has 
explained that:
 “every one of the seven Appellate Body members was conscious 
and determined to contribute to the building of a new institution.  
Every one of us wanted to contribute to the strength and authority 
of this new institution.  We were of course aware that we had to 
build up the reputation, acceptability, and the ensuing legitimacy 
of the Appellate Body from scratch.”41
The Appellate Body members were determined to build an independent institution and 
for the members themselves to be seen as independent: “The determination to gain 
credibility, acceptability, and legitimacy, combined with the paramount concern for 
independence, explains the Appellate Body’s attitude towards consensus, as opposed to 
voting and individual opinions, be they dissenting or concurrent.”42
Similarly, Former Appellate Body Chairman James Bacchus also supported the 
decision to issue collective opinions, explaining that: “It has been important for all of us 
who are members of the Appellate Body to focus on establishing our institution, to speak 
with one voice, and to submerge our own identities into the system itself.  I have tried 
very hard to do that.”43
41
 Ehlermann, supra note 3, at 695.
42
 Ehlermann, supra note 3, at 696.
43 Bacchus, supra note 3, at 960.
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Members of the Appellate Body may therefore have refrained from voicing their 
views when they have not agreed with the majority out of “fear that they will, through 
their dissent, weaken the effectiveness and reputation of the group to which they 
belong.”44
2. Competence and Credibility
The drive for legitimacy may have been grounded in a desire to be seen as 
independent, but also as competent and credible.  As a new institution, the Appellate 
Body may have particularly prioritized unanimity because revealing internal dissension 
could have undermined their nascent role as the ultimate experts on WTO matters.45
Bacchus explains that “[b]y relying on the mutual exercise of reason, we have reached a 
consensus … in every single one of our – to date – nearly sixty appeals….[N]o Member 
of the Appellate Body has – to date – ever dissented to even one of our ultimate rulings 
and recommendations.  This has added to the credibility of our judgments and to the 
historic force of the uniqueness of WTO dispute settlement.”46
Bacchus reveals that the Appellate Body particularly strives for consensus 
because the issues they face are not clear cut, and are nearly all issues of first 
impression.47 It is arguably important to appear to be on the same page when shedding 
light on new and complex issues.  However, it seems even more important to let the 
WTO Members see any differing views regarding these highly complex, nuanced, issues 
that are being raised and examined for the first time.  Using false consensus to hide 
uncertainty may lead to short-term institutional legitimacy, but cannot possibly be a 
44 CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 29 (2003).
45 Smith, supra note 3, at 81.
46
 James Bacchus, Lone Star: The Historic Role of the WTO, 39 TEX. INT’L L. J. 401, 409 (2004).
47
 Bacchus, supra note 37, at 1030.
14
positive in the long-term development of WTO jurisprudence.  WTO Members ideally 
should be able to see any judicial interpretations that the Members perhaps hadn’t 
considered when drafting the WTO Agreements, or even an analysis that better accords 
with their intended meaning than does the majority’s opinion.
3. A Bacchus-Marshall Link?
Former Appellate Body Chairman James Bacchus has a background in history 
and law, and is thus likely quite familiar with the history of the United States Supreme 
under the reigns of one of its earliest Chief Justices, John Marshall.48 Given the 
similarity in approach to separate opinions taken by Marshall and the nascent Appellate 
Body, it may be that Bacchus urged his colleagues that the Appellate Body should 
conduct itself like the early Marshall Court to gain legitimacy.49  Marshall dispensed with 
the original American system (following the practice of the King’s Bench)50 of issuing 
seriatim opinions in favor of single opinions seemingly reflecting unanimous judgments 
in every case.  Marshall insisted on this practice because he felt it would enhance the 
legitimacy of the fledgling court, and many have argued that in so doing, Marshall 
succeeded.51 Marshall’s strong disapproval of separate opinions carried the day for many 
48 Marshall was the fourth Chief Justice, following Justices Jay, Rutledge, and Ellsworth.  Bacchus’s 
writings tend to begin with a historical reference or anecdote.  See, e.g., Bacchus, supra note 46; Bacchus, 
supra note 37; and Bacchus, supra note 3.
49
 Others have suggested parallels between WTO dispute settlement and the Marshall Court.  See Raj 
Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 860-61 
(1999) (“[T]he more appropriate analogy is not between WTO tribunals and present-day American courts.  
Rather, it is between these newborn tribunals and the infant Supreme Court of Chief Justice John Marshall.  
Thus, exploring … whether the WTO faces the same issue our great Chief Justice did might be fruitful: 
how to enhance the legitimacy of the judicial branch?”).
50 For a useful discussion of 1600s and 1700s British judicial structure and practice see Karl M. ZoBell, 
Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186 
(1959).
51 See, e.g., DONALD E. LIVELY, FORESHADOWS OF THE LAW: SUPREME COURT DISSENTS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT xxii (1992); 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 15-
16 (1916).  Others, including this author, have criticized Marshall’s practice of speaking for the Court.  See
A.J. Levin, Mr. William Johnson, Creative Dissenter, 43 MICH. L. REV. 497, 521 (1944); Meredith Kolsky, 
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years, and separate opinions were all but unknown until Justice William Johnson – with 
strong encouragement from Thomas Jefferson – stood up to Marshall and voiced his 
opposition to majority opinions with which he disagreed.52  Bacchus appears to share 
Marshall’s view that consensus leads to legitimacy, and perhaps this belief was reflected 
in Bacchus’s leadership of the Appellate Body.53
Little has been written about Bacchus’s or any of the other Chairmen’s 
substantive leadership of the Appellate Body, but their leadership styles may also have 
contributed to the level of consensus.  In the Supreme Court context it has been suggested 
that there been a higher level of consensus among members of the Court under chief 
justices who have utilized task and social leadership.54  Even Charles Evan Hughes, who 
as an associate justice on the United States Supreme Court famously wrote that: “A 
dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the 
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into 
which the dissenting judge believes the Court may have betrayed”55 became more 
reserved upon becoming the head of the Court.  There is evidence to suggest that, upon 
becoming Chief Justice in 1930, Hughes tried to discourage dissent whenever possible, 
Note, Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court Dissent, 83 GEO. L.J. 2069 (1995).  
The references to early United States practice in this article are primarily drawn from the author’s earlier 
work, cited above.
52 See generally Levin, supra note 51, and Kolsky, supra note 51.
53 See Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States 
Supreme Court, 50 J. OF POL. 361, 379 (1988) (citing David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice 
in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court, in JOEL B. GROSSMAN AND RICHARD S. WELLS, EDS., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 237 (1980)).  The marked increase in dissenting 
opinions in United States Supreme Court decisions that began in the 1940s has been linked to the poor 
leadership of Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.  Dissents were noticeably less frequent under Chief Justices 
with reputations for leadership and collegiality.  See Walker et al, supra.
54 See Walker et al., supra note 54, at 379-82.
55 CHARLES EVAN HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (New York 1928).
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even joining in decisions with which he disagreed in order to present the appearance of a 
united Court.56
B. Process
In addition to the Appellate Body Members’ decision to strive for unanimity
where possible, there may also be aspects of the process WTO panelists and Appellate 
Body Members have taken in resolving disputes that have led to fewer separate opinions 
than might otherwise have been expected.
1. Collegial Approach
The Appellate Body has come up with numerous procedures to effectuate 
unanimity where possible.  In addition to the aforementioned Rule 3.2 which directs the 
Appellate Body to make every effort to achieve consensus, the Working Procedures also 
contain a series of provisions under the heading “Collegiality.”  These provide in relevant 
part as follows:
(1) To ensure consistency and coherence in decision-making, and to draw on 
the individual and collective expertise of the Members, the Members shall 
convene on a regular basis to discuss matters of policy, practice and 
procedure.
(2) The Members shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other 
relevant activities of the WTO and, in particular, each Member shall 
receive all documents filed in an appeal. 
(3) In accordance with the objectives set out in paragraph 1, the division 
responsible for deciding each appeal shall exchange views with the other 
Members before the division finalizes the appellate report for circulation 
to the WTO Members….57
56 See Walker et al., supra note 53, at 382.
57 Working Procedures for Appellate Review Rules 4.1-4.3, WT/AB/WP/5 (4 Jan 2005).
17
The Members have invested a great deal of time and effort into the “exchange of 
views” process called for in Rule 4.3, above.  This has undoubtedly contributed to the 
high level of consensus within the institution.58  Shortly following oral hearings on 
appeals, all seven members of the Appellate Body meet in Geneva and consult with the 
three members that are hearing the particular appeal.  The members engage in an 
extensive dialogue that can last from two days to a week.  Each member has an 
opportunity to weigh in on each issue, and the discussions continue until each issue has 
been fully discussed.  This process has led to a high level of consistency and consensus.59
In addition, the members of the Appellate Body have thus far remained highly 
collegial and have not divided themselves into smaller camps or coalitions.60 Debra 
Steger the first director of the Appellate Body Secretariat attributes this collegiality in 
part to the fact that members do not represent regions or “seats” and as such can be 
distinguished from the ICJ:  “Not only is the ICJ selection process extremely political, 
but the judges, having been appointed to represent a particular region, also tend to vote in
favor of their region.  The Members of the WTO should seek to protect and preserve 
those aspects of the Appellate Body culture that guarantee the maximum independence 
and impartiality.”61
58
 Steger, supra note 30, at 44.
59
 Steger, supra note 30, at 44; see also JACKSON, supra note 5, at 80 (additionally noting the benefit of 
continuity for future cases).
60
 Steger, supra note 30, at 44.
61
 Steger, supra note 30, at 45.  But see Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in 
International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing that international tribunals are more effective 
when they are not independent).  Posner and Yoo include the GATT and WTO in their examination of 
different international tribunals and suggest that “the WTO’s court-like dispute settlement system does not 
necessarily improve behaviour under international trade law and may make it worse.” Id. at 50.
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2. Early Agreement on Interpretive Principles
The Appellate Body also may be achieving a high level of consensus due to a 
meeting of the minds regarding the meaning of the Article 3.2 requirement that the 
covered agreements be clarified “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law.”62  The Members determined that this provision meant 
interpretation in accordance to the rules set forth in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.63 This interpretation is reflected in the Appellate Body report in 
the US – Gasoline case, in which it is stated that the Vienna Convention “has attained the 
status of a rule of customary or general international law”.64 Former Appellate Body 
Member Claus-Dieter Ehlermann explains that “the very early consensus on interpretive 
principles has facilitated decision-making and contributed considerably to the consistency 
and coherence of Appellate Body reports.  At the same time, this consensus has also 
contributed to the already mentioned high degree of collegiality and friendly co-operation 
among the seven Appellate Body members.”65  Ehlermann distinguishes the Appellate 
Body approach from that of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), noting that: “I do not 
remember that the ECJ has ever laid down openly and clearly the rules of interpretation 
that it intended to follow.”66  He argues that the Appellate Body has taken a “literal” 
interpretation of “object and purpose” while the ECJ has taken a “teleological” 
interpretation.67  To Ehlermann and others, this approach has provided a measure of 
62
 Ehlermann, supra note 23 at 508.  Ehlermann suggests that this agreement has led to consistency and 
coherence in the Appellate Body reports.
63
 Ehlermann, supra note 23 at 508.  
64 See Ehlermann, supra note 23 at 508; Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR, 
1996:I, p.3 (16).
65
 Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 509.
66
 Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 509.
67
 Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 509.
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“security and predictability” as required by the Dispute Settlement Understanding68 and 
has had a legitimizing effect.69
If the rules of interpretation are clear, there may be less room for disagreement.  
However, even with a common understanding on approach, it still seems likely that the 
Appellate Body members must have had more significant disagreements than have been 
reflected through separate opinions to date.
3. Acting as an Institution Rather Than as Individuals
The Dispute Settlement Understanding defines the Appellate Body and panels 
very much in institutional rather than individual terms.  Decisions are rendered on an 
anonymous basis, rather than by specific people.  The decisions themselves are styled as 
reports – more evocative of an institutional or collective product – rather than opinions, 
which evoke images of an actual individual author or authors.  Decisions of panels and 
Divisions of the Appellate Body are therefore decisions of the DSB as a whole, and are 
not and should not be taken as the opinions of their authors alone.70
This approach – in many senses more akin to a civil law court than a common law one –
may further explain the mentality of consensus at almost all costs.  If Appellate Body 
members are acting in an institutional sense, the opinions of the individual members are 
arguably not relevant.  There are right answers to be found, and there should not be 
differing views about what that answer is or how that answer is derived. 
68 See DSU Art 3.2 (“The dispute settlement system of the WTO  is a central element in providing security 
and predictability to the multilateral trading system.”).
69
 Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 509; See also J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of 
Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 13 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 177, 195 (2003) (arguing that the Appellate Body has acted with the aim of achieving internal 
and external legitimacy).
70
 For further discussion on the institutional approach, see Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of Dissent in 
the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235, 2238-40 (1996) (discussing Paul W. Kahn’s book, THE REIGN OF 
LAW: MARBURY V MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997)).
20
In the civil law context, judges may see their roles as institutional or 
administrative rather than individual or creative, and as such they would be more likely to 
feel that there is a “right answer” and less likely to seek to author separate opinions.71
Dissents are arguably more prized in the common law tradition because the common law 
views judges as individuals.  In the words of former United States Supreme Court Justice 
Hughes, “[d]issenting opinions enable a judge to express his individuality.  He is not 
under the compulsion of speaking for the court and thus of securing the concurrence of a 
majority.  In dissenting he is free lance.”72
To be sure, dissent is more inherently a part of the common law tradition than it is 
in civil law systems where judges are primarily interpreting code provisions.73  In the 
common law context, publishing dissents “suggest that it would be legitimate and 
appropriate for them one day to form a majority; it makes law in principle infinitely 
revisable.”74  But where does WTO dispute resolution fall along the spectrum?  The 
WTO agreements are not fully analogous to civil code provisions.  They are generally 
less detailed and comprehensive and require significant interpretation on the part of the 
panels and Appellate Body.  At the same time, WTO jurists are engaging in treaty 
interpretation, not applying common law principles.  Treaty interpretation is arguably
71
 I owe thanks to Duncan Webb for raising this point.  See also Arthur Jacobson, Publishing Dissent at 31 
(forthcoming, on file with author). Jacobson argues that the civilian legal authority echoes the intellectual 
structure of its patron, the Catholic Church, and similarly features a transcendental sense of “rightness”.  
The idea of dissent is anathema to this transcendental sense of rightness and hierarchical structure. Id. at 8 
This form was not inevitable by virtue of following religious authority, however.  Jacobson notes that the 
rabbinical tradition of biblical law (Halakhah) not only tolerates but in fact highly values dissent, and that 
the Talmud itself provides transcendent validation for dissent. Id. at 9-10 (citing numerous sources in 
translation).
72 HUGHES, supra note 55, at 68.
73
 While dissents and concurrences have featured routinely in American appellate courts for quite some 
time, this trend is not universal even within the United States.  See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity 
Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127, 132 (1997) (noting that the Delaware Supreme 
Court justices have issued unanimous decisions in ninety-seven percent of reported cases).
74
 Jacobson, supra note 71, at 33.
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subject to less discretion, less disagreement, less variability of opinion than the issues 
addressed by judges in a domestic setting, particularly in common law countries.75
However, if this were the sole explanation we would expect to see a low rate of dissents 
in the opinions of other international courts and tribunals.76  As section II (c), supra, 
demonstrates, however, to the extent other international courts and tribunals permit 
dissents, there has been a far higher incidence of them than in the WTO context.
4. Nonjudicial Nomenclature
Related to whether the Appellate Body Members see themselves as fulfilling 
more administrative and institutional roles or individual judicial ones is the issue of just 
how judicial the Appellate Body is intended to be.  While many consider the Appellate 
Body essentially to be a court of last resort, notably it  is not called “court.”  Decisions are 
issued in reports, and are not called decisions, judgments, or opinions.  Again, if the 
Appellate Body is an administrative organ, dissents would be less appropriate than if it is 
a judicial one.  J.H.H. Weiler argues that the Appellate Body, is, in procedure and 
substance, a high court.77  He sees the choice of nonjudicial nomenclature as serving “the 
internal legitimacy of the construct to pretend” that the Appellate Body isn’t a court, even 
75
 Although the United States did not adopt the Uruguay Round Agreements as treaties, the agreements are 
considered treaties as a matter of international law.  Accordingly panelists and the Appellate Body 
members must apply the rules of treaty interpretation found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (“The Vienna Convention”) May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).  Useful 
articles discussing the Vienna Convention include Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systematic 
Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 I.C.L.Q. 279 (2005) and Susy Frankel, The 
WTO’s Application of ‘the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law’ to Intellectual 
Property, 46 VA J. INT’L L. __ (2005) (forthcoming).
76 See Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the 
International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271 (2003) for a discussion of the scope of the international 
judiciary.  For a comparison between certain WTO procedures and those of other international judicial 
bodies, see FRIEDL WEISS, IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: ISSUES AND LESSONS 
FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2000).
77 Weiler, supra note 69, at 187.
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though “the Appellate Body is a court in all but name.”78  But “the failure to call a court a 
court actually diminishes the external legitimacy of the WTO in general and the 
Appellate Body more specifically.”79
Notwithstanding the official nomenclature for the Appellate Body and its work, 
Members of the Appellate Body have clearly seen themselves as judges.  For example, 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann refers to himself as having been a judge: “Becoming a judge is 
in all circumstances an interesting experience.  Becoming a judge of a newly established 
(quasi) judicial body … is simply fascinating.”80  Likewise, Ehlermann refers to the 
Appellate Body as “this newly established appeal ‘court’” and to participating “as a judge 
in a judicial ‘green field’ operation at the highest level for the world at large.”81
Likewise, James Bacchus explains that his role as a “faceless foreign judge” has been 
referred to as quasi-judicial, but that it is actually highly legalistic.82
5. Actual Unanimity or Collegial Concurrence
It is possible of course that the high percentage of unanimous opinions is due to 
actual unanimity among the Appellate Body.  This seems somewhat improbable because 
of the comments of Appellate Body Members suggesting there have been areas of 
disagreement.83  It seems additionally unlikely because the Appellate Body has been 
78 Weiler, supra note 69, at 189.
79 Weiler, supra note 69, at 190.  Weiler thus advocates that the Appellate Body should be given the official 
name of “The International Court of Economic Justice” to be known colloquially as “The World Trade 
Court.” Id.; see also John P. Gaffney, Due Process in the World Trade Organization: the Need for 
Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1173, 1191-92 (1999) 
(arguing that the Appellate Body acts much like a constitutional court and as such “is more likely [than 
dispute settlement panels] to foster a greater concern towards the integrity of the dispute settlement system. 
It may, therefore, evolve into a body that seeks to ensure decisions are taken with the appropriate 
procedures that foster the democratic and contractarian nature of the WTO system and engage in judicial 
activism to the extent necessary to achieve this end.”). 
80
 Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 500.
81
 Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 500.
82
 Bacchus, supra note 37, at 1024-26.
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faced with many challenging issues, most of them issues of first impression.  It may be 
the case however that there has been “collegial concurrence” in some disputes where the 
disagreeing Member doesn’t feel, for whatever reason, that it is “worth” dissenting.  This 
would suggest that dissents would likely only occur in matters of high institutional 
importance, rather than ones that would likely only affect the parties to the dispute.84
One would expect that the fact that dissents have to be anonymous would lead 
Appellate Body members and dispute settlement panelists to issue relatively more 
dissents than if their identity was known.  As Cass Sunstein has explained, “If people are 
allowed to say what they think without disclosing who they are, they will be more likely 
to say what they think.”85 In practice, however, the cloak of anonymity clearly has not 
been enough to convince disagreeing jurists to write separately.  Perhaps the reason is 
that while the public at large, the WTO membership, and the parties to the dispute would 
not know who a dissenter was, the two panelists in the majority would know, and 
presumably, in the case of an Appellate Body opinion, so would the non-participating 
four Members.86  This conformity could therefore be a case of “collegial concurrence,” 
83 See, e.g., Bacchus, supra note 37, at 1029-30; Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 508.
84
 The unusualness of the EC—Asbestos concurrence has been linked to the subject matter at hand: 
“Separate opinions are unusual, if not previously unknown, in Appellate Body reports, a factor that itself 
tends to underscore the importance of the issue under consideration.”  Bernard H. Oxman, International 
Decisions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 435, 438 n.20 (2002).
85 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 30. In Asch’s experiments the level of conformity and error were 
significantly diminished when participants gave their responses anonymously.  See id. at 47. It has been 
argued that the dissents are anonymous so that Appellate Body members “cannot be accused of being 
biased.”  Patrick Specht, The Dispute Settlement Systems of WTO and NAFTA – Analysis and Comparison, 
27 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 57, 86 (1998).  In the NAFTA context, the anonymity requirement has 
garnered some praise: “Thus protests with respect to a possible national bias are avoided, and the integrity 
of the process is ensured.”  Id. at 103; Jeffrey P. Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute Resolution Under the 
NAFTA: The Newer and Improved Model, 27 INT’L LAW. 603, 617-18 (1993). Keeping dissents – and all 
opinions – anonymous also prevents parties from being able to try to manipulate the composition of 
Appellate Body panels. Specht, supra, at 86.
86
 While Appellate Body divisions consist of three members, the practice of the Appellate Body has been 
for division members to discuss their appeals openly with the other Appellate Body members. Working 
Procedures Rule 4.3
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whereby members or panelists decide not to cause tension among their colleagues by 
issuing a lone and thus arguably useless dissent unless they feel particularly strongly 
about the issue in dispute.87
If collegial concurrence were playing a role in the WTO context, we would expect 
to see relatively more separate opinions from dispute settlement panels than from 
Appellate Body opinions because the members of the Appellate Body are repeat players 
with one another and thus have more of an incentive to act collegially.  In contrast 
dispute settlement panelists are chosen on an ad hoc basis and are far less likely to be 
repeat players at all, much less with their co-panelists.88  In practice there has been a 
higher incidence of dissents at the panel level, but the level is so low at both the panel 
and Appellate Body levels that the difference does not appear particularly stark.  
However, it may be the case that panelists and Appellate Body Members do 
disagree more than opinions reflect, but that they engage in collegial concurrence except 
in cases the disagreeing jurist feels is of particular institutional importance.  The nature of 
the separate opinions seems to support this theory.  In the EC-Asbestos concurrence, one 
of the Appellate Body members questioned the majority’s formulation for determining 
whether forms of asbestos were “like products.”  The majority had framed the test in 
terms of the economic nature of the products.  The concurring member was of the view 
that the hazardous nature of a product is also relevant.  As such, the fact that certain 
forms of asbestos are carcinogenic would support a finding that carcinogenic asbestos 
87 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 182.
88
 Some argue the system of ad hoc panelists should be replaced with a permanent roster of panelists.  See, 
e.g., WTO Dispute Settlement Body Report, Contribution of the European Communities and Its member 
States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/1 (Mar. 13, 2002); 
See also Mackenzie and Sands, supra note 76 at 281 (noting concerns with the ad hoc system). 
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and its noncarcinogenic alternatives are not like products.89  The methodology for 
determining whether products are “like” has been the subject of much discussion and 
debate.90  Thus, while the concurring member did not explain the reason for departing 
from the past practice of unanimity, it may have been due to the importance of the like 
product test, which is applied on a regular basis in a wide array of contexts.
In the Upland Cotton case, the Appellate Body appears to be in accord on all 
issues save one, involving an interpretation of Article 10.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  On this issue, the Report states that Article 10 obliges members to subject 
export credit programs to the export subsidy disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture
immediately.91  One member of the Division disagreed with this interpretation, arguing 
that the absence of mention in Article 9 of export credit guarantees, export credits, and 
insurance programs means “that such measures would not be subject to any disciplines 
until such time as disciplines were internationally agreed upon pursuant to Article 
10.2.”92  While this issue is of less significance to the whole of the WTO membership 
than the like product question raised in the EC – Asbestos case, the United States’ export 
subsidy programs have a significant impact on trade flows both within and outside the 
United States and as such much was riding on the outcome of the dispute.
89 Appellate Body Report for European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, ¶¶ 149-54, WT/DS135/AB/R (12 March 2001).
90 See, e.g., Won Mog Choi, Overcoming the "Aim and Effect" Theory: Interpretation of the "Like Product" 
in GATT Article III, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 107 (2002); Donald H. Regan, Regulatory Purpose
and 'Like Products' in Article III:4 of the GATT (With Additional Remarks on Article II:2), 36 J. WORLD 
TRADE 443 (2002); Julian Wong, Are Biotech Crops and Conventional Crops Like Products?  An Analysis 
Under GATT, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0027.0027
91
 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 638, WT/DS267/AB/R 
(March 3, 2005).  
92
 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 631, WT/DS267/AB/R 
(March 3, 2005).  
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Similarly, at the panel level the reports containing separate opinions have dealt 
with contentious issues involving the major WTO economies.  Each of the separate 
opinions comes in a case involving either the EC or United States or both.  Several deal 
with antidumping and countervailing duty methodologies, the handling of which by 
panels and the Appellate Body has been the subject of much scrutiny, debate, and 
criticism.  Others have addressed issues relating to the protection of agricultural markets, 
another highly controversial area that has an impact on most WTO members.
C. Institutional and Systemic Features
A final set of factors that may explain the dearth of WTO dissents lie in aspects of 
the institutional structure and system for resolving disputes.  These factors include the 
length of Appellate Body Members’ terms in office, the role of the WTO Secretariat, and 
structural issues such as the DSB’s nondiscretionary docket.
1. The reappointment issue
The terms under which Appellate Body Members serve may be influencing their 
decisions not to write separately.  Judges on international tribunals are often appointed 
for relatively short fixed terms, which are then renewable, as is the case with the 
Appellate Body Members, who serve four-year terms with the possibility of one renewal.  
Other examples include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (six years) and the 
European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice (six years).93  Many 
have questioned whether this system influences international jurists such as the Appellate 
Body Members and others whose judicial appointments are subject to discretionary 
93
 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 23(1) Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
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renewal to act in a way to maximize the likelihood of re-election.94  Tellingly, for both 
the ICJ and ITLOS, in which dissents are prevalent, judges are appointed for 9 year 
terms.95
The need to get reappointed may be a factor in convincing Appellate Body 
Members not to write separately.  In the Luxembourg Courts – the EFTA Court, the ECJ, 
and the CFI (Court of First Instance of the European Communities) – judges all serve s ix-
year terms with the possibility of renewal.  There have not been complaints of lack of 
independence,96 but there is no open vote system in any of these courts.  “The main 
argument against introducing a dissenting opinion system in the Community courts and 
the EFTA Court is the fear that dissenting judges could be exposed to pressures by 
governments and their chances to be reappointed could be placed at risk.”97 The solution 
in the WTO context could therefore be to change from a system of four-year renewable 
terms to one of a single eight-year nonrenewable term.98  In addition to providing more 
independence generally, it might also lead to more dissenting opinions.
2. Institutional Characteristics
Studies have suggested that the presence or absence of certain institutional 
features seems to affect the likelihood of dissent.  For example, there is a higher 
incidence of dissent in state supreme courts when there is an intermediate appellate court; 
94 See, e.g., Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 76, at 279; Baudenbacher, supra note 28; Ehlermann, supra
note 23, at 502: a “four-year term, which may be renewed once, does not seem to guarantee sufficiently the 
independence of the person appointed.”  See also Steger, supra note 30, at 46 (noting that one non-
renewable term of 8 to 10 years would better ensure independence and impartiality than the current system 
of four-year terms that can be renewed once).  In contrast, Judges serving either life terms or one non-
renewable term need not worry about the impact their decisions will have on their job tenure. But see
Posner & Yoo, supra note 61. 
95
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 13(1), Stat. 1055, 33. U.N.T.S. 993;
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 5.1, Annex VI, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
96 Baudenbacher, supra note 28, at 384; Mackenzie & Sands, supra note 76, at  271.  
97 Baudenbacher, supra note 28, at 384.  Member States have different practices for determining whether to 
renew. Id.
98 See Steger, supra note 30, at 46.
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heavy caseloads reduce the incidence of dissent;  and a discretionary docket is correlated 
with more dissent.99 It has been postulated that when a court’s schedule is filled with 
nondiscretionary cases and a high volume of appeals (that would presumably be reduced 
through the presence of an intermediate appeals court), there is no time for competing 
views to emerge and as such, coalitions that form are inclusive rather than exclusive.100
In the case of the WTO Appellate Body, all of these characteristics are present, which 
may be leading to fewer dissents.  There is no intermediate appellate entity between the 
panels and Appellate Body; the Appellate Body has no discretion over its caseload; and 
the Appellate Body has a far busier workload than was initially contemplated.101
Furthermore, many of the Appellate Body’s procedures, and the overall emphasis 
on consensus, make sense given that the DSU was replacing a system that relied entirely 
upon consensus.102 Indeed, the DSB did not intend for the Appellate Body to be an 
international trade court.  Instead, it was meant to serve as a safety valve in the event a 
panel reached an incorrect decision.103
3. The role of the WTO Secretariat
A final systemic factor that may be minimizing the number of dissents at the 
Panel level is the strong influence of the Secretariat.  One might think that because the 
panels are ad hoc and often consist of individuals who are serving on their first panel, the 
decisions would be less unified.  However, the WTO Secretariat provides significant 
99
 Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Neo-Institutionalism and Dissent in State Supreme Courts, 52 J. OF 
POL. 54, 59 (1990) (citing studies).
100 Id. at 59.
101 See Steger, supra note 30, at 41-42.
102 Cf. Skeel, supra note 73, at 133-36 (identifying the judicial selection process, size of the court, and 
internal rules and operating procedures as potential reasons why the Delaware Supreme Court is unanimous 
in the vast majority of its cases).
103 See Skeel, supra note 73, at 133-36.
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assistance to panels on not just administrative matters, but also on the substantive issues 
raised by a dispute.104  With an experienced institutional entity providing significant 
guidance on the substantive legal issues, a panelist holding a contrary view would have to 
feel strongly indeed to express their disagreement with this expertise.
IV. In Support of Dissents
Notwithstanding the DSB’s disdain for writing separately, there are compelling 
reasons why dissenting opinions should be permitted – without any associated 
disapproval – and indeed much has been written extolling the virtues of judicial 
dissent.105 Dissents can help improve majority opinions and can provide useful reference 
points for later jurists reconsidering the issues under consideration.  Furthermore, dissents
can highlight ambiguities in the law as drafted, and in so doing prod the drafters to amend 
the law as needed.  Dissents can without a doubt have a corrosive effect on cohesiveness, 
legitimacy, and collegiality, and as such should be used wisely.  But under the proper 
circumstances dissents serve a valuable function.
104 See DSU Art. 27.1; A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System (WTO Secretariat Publication, 
Cambridge, 2004) at 22 (“Because panels are not permanent bodies, the Secretariat serves as the 
institutional memory to provide some continuity and consistency between panels…”).  The Secretariat 
staff’s role varies depending on the panel’s preference, but can include drafting the findings and providing 
other significant guidance.  See James Cameron & Stephen J. Orava, GATT/WTO Panels Between 
Recording and Finding Facts: Issues of Due Process, Evidence, Burden of Proof, and Standard of Review 
in GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in FRIEDL WEISS, IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
PROCEDURES: ISSUES AND LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRUBUNALS 206 (2000).  The Secretariat’s legal advice has significance influence over Panelists, who the 
Secretariat also helps to select.  See J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 69, at 195 (arguing that the Secretariat’s 
legal advice should be provided more openly and transparently so that it can be properly evaluated by the 
Appellate Body and the Member disadvantaged by the advice).  
105 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133 (1990); Andrew Lynch, Dissent: The 
Rewards and Risks of Judicial Disagreement in the High Court of Australia, 27 MELB. U. L. Rev. 724 
(2003); Kolsky, supra note 51; Stack, supra note 70; Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of 
Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. U.L. REV. 583 (1994).  Most of these pieces also 
identify arguments against dissenting, but all defend the practice in at least some instances.
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A. Improving Judicial Decisions
The realistic possibility that a fellow jurist will dissent forces the majority to 
contend with alternate viewpoints.  In so doing, the majority will correct some of its own 
errors106 and will sharpen the logic of its opinion.  Where single opinions are always 
issued, opinions are likely to be less sharp and less representative of the entire court’s 
views.107
As Justice Brennan eloquently explained, a marketplace of ideas will result in the 
best-informed decisions:
At the heart of that function is the critical recognition that 
vigorous debate improves the final product by forcing the 
prevailing side to deal with the hardest questions urged by the 
losing side.  In this sense, the function reflects the conviction that 
the best way to find the truth is to go looking for it in the 
marketplace of ideas.  It is as if the opinions of the Court – both 
for the majority and the dissent – were the product of a judicial 
town meeting.108
In fact, published accounts of Appellate Body decision-making suggest that the 
members’ “exchange of views” process is largely like that which Brennan describes.  
And Appellate Body decisions have probably in fact been improved through the majority 
contending with any minority views raised through this process.  Unlike the modern 
United States Supreme Court, which has been described as being nine separate mini law 
106 SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 177.  See also Richard Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 
48 DUKE L.J. 243, 245-46 (1998) (noting that certain Supreme Court dissents such as Justice Harlan’s 
dissent to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and Justice Holmes’s dissent to Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905) are canonical texts in their own right and are often cited as authority despite the fact 
that the Court never formally overruled the majority decisions).  Primus argues that the use of dissents as 
authority means the constitutional canon must be subject to revision, for dissenting opinions are, by 
definition, not authoritative at the time they are written.  Id. at 247.
107 In the Privy Council context, former Law Lords have indicated that the need to reach single judgments 
led either to weak “lowest common denominator” judgments or to judgments which often represented the 
view of the jurist author but not that of the bench as a whole. See Lynch, supra note 105, at 738.
108
 Brennan, supra note 105, at 430.  See also Lynch, supra note 105, at 726 (arguing that the possibility of 
dissenting opinions leads to clearer decision drafting and sharper clarification of the views of the majority).
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firms that rarely interact, the Appellate Body Members do sit around the table and talk 
through the issues.  The primary difference between the ideal as described by Brennan 
and the Appellate Body approach appears to be that the Appellate Body members 
continue debating until the last holdout either comes to agree with the majority or decides 
to drop his or her opposition in the interests of obtaining a unanimous decision.109
It may be that there have been cases where Members holding minority opinions 
have pushed their case, but then decided not to write separately once their argument has
been addressed but rejected.  Justice Brandeis utilized this approach on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, often circulating draft dissents but then deciding not to dissent to the final opinion 
if he did not think the opinion was going to cause significant harm.110 The Brandeis 
approach is laudable from a collegiality perspective, but is not as useful to interpreters of 
the court or to future jurists as is publishing one’s dissents.  Publishing dissents 
demonstrates that the majority was aware of the minority view, considered it, and 
rejected it for reasons that tend to be elaborated in the opinion.111
Dissents also improve majority opinions by getting adjudicators to follow the 
law.112  In a fascinating study published in the Yale Law Journal and discussed in Cass 
Sunstein’s book on dissent, the authors argued that courts are more likely to comply with 
legal doctrine when there is a political or ideological split on the judicial panel: “This 
results from the presence of a minority position on the panel that creates an opportunity 
for whistle blowing – a minority member with doctrine on her side and the ability, 
109
 In an informal discussion with the author, a former member of the Appellate Body explained that the 
members would discuss the issues at great length until everyone agreed, or barring agreement, until those 
that disagreed elected to back down so that consensus could be maintained.
110
 Gaffney, supra note 101, at 608-09.
111 See, e.g,. Jacobson, supra note 71, at 13; Lynch, supra note 105, at 758.
112 SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 176.  Sunstein references Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller’s study, cited 
infra, as showing “the importance of a potential dissenter, or whistleblower, in ensuring that courts follow 
the law.”
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through a dissent, to expose disobedient decision-making by the majority.”113  The 
presence of a whistleblower may lead the majority to keep its decisions in line with the 
legal doctrine.114  Perhaps this has been happening all along on the Appellate Body.  
However, it seems that for a whistleblower to have an effect on the majority, the threat of 
dissenting would have to be real rather than theoretical.115
B. Dissents as Markers for the Future
Dissents can serve the additional valuable function of drawing attention to the 
weaknesses or flaws in a majority opinion and providing an alternative approach.  The 
dissent can then be used as a roadmap of sorts by future juris ts panels revisiting the same 
issues – and on this subsequent consideration possibly to reach the result encouraged by 
the original dissenter(s).
C. Spurs for Political Action
Finally, dissents may point out the ambiguities or flaws in a law and thus spur 
legislators to make amendments if necessary.  In the WTO context, where the legislative 
branch has been particularly weak, dissents might serve as a useful nudge to get the 
Members to make necessary changes.
D. Dissents Should be Used Judiciously
Although dissents serve many useful purposes, they can have negative effects on 
the judicial institution and the respect its decisions receive.  Even supporters of dissent 
tend to agree that the practice should be exercised sparingly.  The American Bar 
113
 Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals , 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 (1998). 
114 Id. at 2159. 
115
 With only one dissent in seventy-six reports, and the Working Procedures language strongly 
discouraging dissents, it seems that the right to dissent is more illusory than real.
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Association issued an opinion in 1923 cautioning for only limited use of dissents: “judges 
constituting a court of last resort should use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity 
of conclusion and the consequent influence of judicial decision….[E]xcept in case of 
conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissents should be 
discouraged.”116
In the WTO context, some feel that the Appellate Body should be applauded for 
banding together and avoiding the high levels of dissent in ITLOS and ICJ disputes,117
and feel that if the Appellate Body reports included minority opinions it would weaken 
the authoritative impact of the reports.118 These views may go too far in the other 
direction.  Having dissents in every case clearly would not be desirable, but the status quo 
of having essentially none is also far from ideal.
The Appellate Body and dispute settlement panels should therefore utilize 
dissents and concurrences when there are significant disagreements as to interpretation 
and/or outcome.  Even if the Appellate Body would reach the same outcome in a given 
dispute, there are likely instances when the members of the Division have different 
rationales for why the outcome should be what it is.  Separate concurring opinions may 
be appropriate in such instances, rather than dissents.  While this article opposes a shift to 
seriatim decisions, there are undoubtedly instances where the DSB would benefit from 
seeing the different alternative approaches panelists proffer, though the end result is the 
same.119
116
 ABA Proposed Canons of Judicial Ethics, No. 19.  See also LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 
(1958) (a dissent “cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges 
so largely depends.”).
117
 McRae, supra note 32, at 39.
118
 Specht, supra note 85, at 86.
119
 Ginsburg, supra note 105, at 136 (noting similar benefits of dissents and concurrences).
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V. Does the WTO Need More Dissent?
This section explores whether the WTO would benefit if there were more dissents 
at the panel and Appellate Body levels, taking into consideration whether WTO decisions 
have a precedential effect on later disputes; potential negative consequences flowing 
from the lack of dissent; and whether the few dissents to date have had any influence.
A. Do Dissents Matter in the WTO Context – the Question of Precedent
One issue affecting whether dissents have a role to play in WTO dispute 
resolution is what weight previous WTO decisions will be given by future panels and 
Divisions of the Appellate Body.  If decisions have precedential effect, then the logic 
used by the majority – and any minority – in a dispute is more important for future cases 
than if reports do not have precedential effect.  While as a technical matter stare decisis 
does not apply in the WTO context, as a practical one, panels and the Appellate Body do 
appear to rely heavily on the logic in past reports.
The Appellate Body addressed this issue in the Japan – Alcoholic Beverages 
Case, stating that:
Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis.  
They are often considered by subsequent panels.  They create 
legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, 
should be taken into account where they are relevant to any 
dispute.  However, they are not binding, except with respect to 
resolving the particular dispute between the parties to that 
dispute.120
The Japan – Alcoholic Beverages p anel report notes that the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice has an explicit provision, Article 59, to the same effect: 
“This has not inhibited the development by that Court (and its predecessor) of a body of 
120
 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages WT/DS8 (and 10, 11)/AB/R (1996) p. 14.
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case law in which considerable reliance on the value of previous decisions is readily 
discernible.”121
Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice clearly disavows any 
stare decisis effect of that Court’s decisions: “The decision of the Court has no binding 
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”  But (ICJ Judge) 
Mohamed Shahabuddeen argues that Article 59 “has no bearing on the question of 
precedents.”122  There is nothing in Article 59 to preclude a given decision from being 
referred to in a future case as “a statement of what the Court regarded as the correct legal 
position.”123 However, Shahabuddeen also says that “There is agreement on all hands 
that stare decisis is not applicable to the Court,”124 though this lack of applicability is not 
due to Article 59 of the ICJ Statute.125  Instead, judicial decisions fall within the category 
of subsidiary sources of international law as provided for in Article 38(1)(d).  In fact, 
while the ICJ does not consider itself required to follow its prior decisions in the binding 
precedent sense, it in fact does refer to and consider its former decisions through 
reference to Article 38(1)(d).126  The WTO dispute settlement panels and Appellate Body
have similarly disavowed any requirement that they follow Appellate Body precedents, 
but have in practice made frequent reference to prior Appellate Body decisions.127
121
 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages WT/DS8 (and 10, 11)/AB/R (1996) p. 14, n.30.  See also
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 6, at 38-47 for a discussion of prior panel and Appellate Body reports 
as sources of law under Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
122 MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 63 (1996) (arguing that Article 59 only 
has bearing on the parties to the current dispute).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 54.
125 Id. at 99.
126 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 6, at 38.
127 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 6, at 38.
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The WTO’s training materials advise that: “As in other areas of international law, 
there is no rule of stare decisis in WTO dispute settlement according to which previous 
rulings bind panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent cases.”128
Likewise, the DSU provides that: “Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add 
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements”129 and 
Article IX.2 of the WTO Agreement states that: “The ministerial Conference and the 
General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements.”
The WTO provisions seem to suggest that prior opinions do not have a significant 
role to play.  But the Appellate Body’s actions suggest otherwise:
Perhaps more important than the ambivalent texts is the practice 
of the Appellate Body, which from the beginning has acted as if it 
were a court.  It has insisted that panels apply the law as if they 
were judicial bodies, including applying the law that has been 
developed in the decisions of the Appellate Body itself.  And the 
Appellate Body has in practice followed its own prior decisions.  
Although there is no provision for stare decisis within the WTO 
process, the Appellate Body has effectively created a form of a 
doctrine of precedent in WTO dispute settlement, not unlike 
precedent in the early days of the common law.130
Ehlermann likewise suggests that the Appellate Body views their decisions as 
having significant precedential value: “care must be taken not to use arguments that could 
lead to incorrect results in future cases.  Legal security and predictability would not be 
served by an apparently richer motivation offered today if that motivation or reasoning 
128 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.htm (last accessed April 
17, 2006).
129
 DSU Art. 3.2
130 Donald McRae, What is the Future of WTO Dispute Settlement? 7 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 3, 7-8 (2004).  See 
also JACKSON, supra note 6, at 83 (arguing that while under international law generally tribunal decisions 
do not have de jure precedential effect, in the WTO context “there is clearly a de facto precedential effect 
operating, albeit not strictly”).
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has to be changed or corrected in a future case.”131  Notwithstanding the ways in which 
the DSU and Appellate Body Working Procedures evoke civil law images, Don McRae 
has argued that: “The insistence of the Appellate Body on panels treating the Appellate 
Body’s interpretation of the WTO agreements as binding in future cases is very much in 
the common law tradition.”132  In effect, “All precedent now in the WTO dispute 
settlement system is binding.  The only real question is whether it is binding in a de facto 
or de jure sense.”133  Thus while there is some disagreement over the formal legal status 
of Appellate Body precedents, in practice the Appellate Body and panels have referred 
and deferred to the analysis set forth in prior decisions.  As such, the lack of a formal 
system of precedent does not negate the value dissenting opinions would serve.  Indeed, it 
has been argued that:
One of the more troubling aspects of WTO panel and 
Appellate Body decision-making has been the general absence 
of dissent.  This may be tolerable in a civil law system that 
doesn’t put the same weight on precedent as in common law 
systems, but it should be unacceptable from dispute settlement 
bodies that routinely quote their former decisions as 
authority.134
And even though there may be reasons why civil law jurisdictions are less likely 
to publish dissents, it is still troubling that they fail to do so.  As Arthur Jacobson 
explains, “[b]ecause disagreement just as surely marks discussion in civilian panels, 
failing to publish separate opinions has the effect of masking it against public inspection 
or awareness.”135  Likewise, it is hard to believe, notwithstanding the emphasis the 
131
 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate Body, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 469, 486 
(2003).
132
 McRae, supra note 130, at 8.
133 Bhala, supra note 49, at 853.
134
 Greenwald, supra note 3, at 123-24.  
135
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Appellate Body has put on reaching consensus, that there haven’t been serious 
disagreements.  This raises the question of whether Appellate Body members have 
actually always become convinced of the majority’s view, or whether on occasion 
members have stood in silent disagreement with a portion of a decision.  It would be 
unfortunate if the latter were the case, though it seems likely that this is in fact what 
happens from time to time.
It may be that the dispute settlement panels and Appellate Body have had 
members who acted as potential whistleblowers and thus changed decisions from what 
they otherwise would have been.  We cannot know whether this has happened.  But even 
if this does occur behind the scenes, the WTO community would still be losing out on the 
other benefits of having opposing views actually set forth for all to see.  Behind the 
scenes activities do nothing to improve the situation when the majority decision might 
otherwise be viewed as incorrect.  In contrast, when the dissenter publishes his or her 
opinion, a future panel may reference that dissent as the better approach and reject the 
initial decision136 in favor of the approach elucidated in the dissent.  Of course it is 
possible in later cases for jurists to reach different outcomes even without the benefit of 
dissenting opinions, but the process is a much easier one when a roadmap exists setting 
forth the flaws in the first decision and an alternative path forward.
B. Dissents on Dissent
In addition to the reasons addressed in Part IV, supra, regarding the benefits of 
dissent generally, in the WTO context there are particular reasons why the overwhelming 
unanimity of panel and Appellate Body decisions should be a cause for concern.  The 
136
 Because the Appellate Body reports are not binding, as discussed supra, an Appellate Body panel would 
not overrule an earlier report with which it disagreed, but it could decline to follow the reasoning in an 
earlier report and instead adopt the interpretation set forth in a dissent.
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lack of dissent is in many ways emblematic of the broader refrain that the WTO is 
insufficiently transparent.  Likewise, developing countries see the unanimous decisions as 
monolithic edicts that do not reflect their concerns.  In addition, the lack of dissent is 
arguably making it even more difficult for the already weak political arm of the WTO to 
fulfill its responsibilities.
1. Lack of transparency
Although WTO dispute resolution has garnered high praise in most respects, the 
process itself has been criticized for not being sufficiently transparent.  Panel proceedings 
are closed to the public,137 written submissions are not required to be public, and opinions 
are written anonymously.  This secrecy is arguably just a continuation of some of the 
diplomatic behind closed-doors methods used in the GATT era.  While this may be 
appropriate in the pre-Panel phase, when confidential resolution is still possible, there is 
little justification once a dispute reaches the stage of establishing a Panel.138  The system 
may just reflect long-term institutional inertia, but “it should be recognized that we have 
put in place a judicial process.  It is inconsistent with basic principles of open government 
and transparency of legal proceedings and inconsistent with the very significant issues 
now under dispute, that the principles of secrecy should still prevail.”139
The lack of dissent in WTO dispute settlement coupled with the requirement that 
decisions be issued anonymously is a further illustration of the transparency problem.  If 
panel and Appellate Body sessions were public, Members and other observers might have 
137 Some countries including the United States make their submissions available via the Internet almost 
immediately upon filing.  Other Members can and do elect not to provide public access to their dispute 
settlement submissions.
138
 Weiler, supra note 69, at 191.
139
 Weiler, supra note 69, at 191.
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a broader sense of who really supports a certain position and who likely went along just 
in the interests of consensus.  But because sessions are closed and opinions are 
anonymous, it is not at all evident what the specific views are of individual panelists or 
Appellate Body Members. Thomas Jefferson disdained the issuance of single opinions 
prevalent under the early Marshall Court, referring to the practice as “certainly 
convenient for the lazy, the modest & the incompetent.”140  While this article does not 
intend to impugn the members of the Appellate Body or dispute settlement panels as lazy, 
modest or incompetent, Jefferson did hit upon an important issue – that of accountability.  
The fact that opinions cannot be attributed to particular panelists or Division members is 
problematic, particularly in the current climate of dissatisfaction over the lack of WTO 
transparency.
This might not matter if, in fact, the Appellate Body were always in full 
agreement on all issues.  It seems unlikely, however, that this is the case, particularly 
given some of the highly nuanced and challenging cases that have been decided thus far.  
Ehlermann acknowledges that the lack of dissent “is no proof of total unanimity in all 
cases with respect to all arguments” but he believes that if there weren’t actually a high 
degree of consensus, “one would probably have seen more manifestations of individual 
positions.”141  This may be correct; however, there have been indications from other 
members of the Appellate Body that unanimity has been by deliberate design rather than 
a natural outcome of individuals all in agreement with one another all the time.142
140 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), microformed on The Thomas 
Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress Microfilm Series 1, Reel 53, printed in 12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 246, 249-50 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905).
141
 Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 508.
142 See infra Part III(A).
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At least some former Members of the Appellate Body agree that more openness 
and transparency is needed in the process.  Claus-Dieter Ehlermann has commented that:
Panel meetings are closed.  This provision is clearly a remnant 
of the original function of panels as instruments of diplomatic 
dispute settlement, along with consultation, good offices, 
conciliation, and mediation.  However, confidentiality of all 
phases of the panel proceedings – as opposed to the internal 
deliberations among the panelists, is hardly compatible with 
the new, quasi-judicial character of the panel process.143
Likewise, Julio Lacarte, former Chairman of the Appellate Body, acknowledges
that the WTO should be more transparent.  He has argued that if proceedings of the 
United Nations Security Council are broadcast live on television and radio, surely the 
WTO could be more open than it is: “[D]oes anyone doubt that the public debates on Iraq 
were accompanied by intense, secret diplomatic contacts?  If public discussion and 
private negotiations can take place simultaneously in the Security Council, they certainly 
can do so in the trade field.”144 Lacarte advocates for, among other things, “open 
hearings of panels and the Appellate Body, and a substantially enlarged availability of 
documentation.”145
Writing separate opinions allows those on the outside to see where the disagreements 
lie and how overall trends may change over time.  In contrast, it may be the case that by 
masking disagreement through unanimous decisions, the Appellate Body is increasing the 
likelihood it will end up “cycling” from one interpretive or doctrinal approach to 
another146 rather than refining its positions in a transparent fashion.  In this respect, all 
143
 Ehlermann, supra note 131, at 472.
144
 Julio A. Lacarte, Transparency, Public Debate and Participation by NGOs in the WTO: a WTO 
Perspective, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 683, 684 (2004).
145 Id.
146 See Skeel, supra note 73, at 153 (arguing that unanimity can lead to increased doctrinal instability by 
raising the risk of cycling and clouding the development of legal doctrine).
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but requiring consensus in the name of achieving institutional legitimacy could result in a 
less predictable and reliable – and thus less legitimate – institution in the long run.
2. Proposals to require separate opinions
The unanimous nature of most dispute settlement decisions has not gone 
unnoticed by the WTO membership.  In the course of the ongoing review of the DSU, 
there have been two proposals that would increase the number of dissents.147
Interestingly, it has not been common law countries clamoring for more dissent and civil 
law countries advocating the status quo. Instead, the proposals have come from the Least 
Developed Countries (LDC) Group and the Africa Group – whose members reflect 
diverse national legal systems.  These groups argue that development-oriented positions 
are not adequately expressed in monolithic decisions and that an increase in dissents 
would bring their issues more to the forefront and public eye.
The LDC Group’s proposal bears setting forth in full:148
The need for dissenting opinions in panel reports
1. A careful reading of the accumulated jurisprudence 
of the DS system thus far reveals that the interests and 
perspectives of developing countries have not been adequately 
taken into account.  The panels and the Appellate Body have 
displayed an excessively sanitized concern with legalisms, 
often to the detriment of the evolution of a development-
friendly jurisprudence.  This stifling approach may be 
attributable to the requirement that every panel or Appellate 
Body Division should emerge with a single neat report.  There 
is no provision for dissenting judgments in the DSU.  This 
needs some re-thinking given the inadequacies highlighted in 
the DS jurisprudence.  Often, and as demonstrated by judicial 
practice at the International Court of Justice, and in certain 
147 Members agreed in May 2004 to extend negotiations on the review of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), beyond the original deadline of May 31, 2004.  These negotiations are ongoing.
148
 TN/DS/W/17 (October 9, 2002).  
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national court systems, dissenting judgments may bring to the 
fore usually unheard concerns which may in the long run 
shape the evolution of the system.  Dissenting judgments 
should be allowed in the DS system through a rule that the 
Members of the panel or Appellate Body should each deliver a 
judgment and the final decision be taken on the basis of a 
majority.  LDCs understand that this may mean additional 
resources and work for the Secretariat.
The African Group also put forth a proposal that Article 14.3 and Article 17.11 be 
amended to require panelists and Appellate Body members to issue separate opinions, 
though where two or more panelists or two or more members are in agreement, they 
would have the option of providing a joint opinion.149
Victor Mosoti, the coordinator of the Africa Trade Program at the International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development has explained that WTO dispute 
settlement is important to Africa; but that the benefits for the continent would be greater 
if there were more divergent opinions: “We also suggest that one way of ensuring that a 
development jurisprudence evolves incrementally is by allowing for panelists and 
appellate body Members to freely express their legal opinions unfettered by the strictures 
of having a single uniform consensual final opinion.”150  The current WTO practice has 
the “unavoidable result of muting what could be bold divergent development oriented 
views.”151 Mosoti notes that in many common law countries some of the most widely 
accepted legal principles of today were introduced in the form of dissents, and argues that 
there is no reason the same thing couldn’t happen in the WTO, either with dissenting 
149 TN/DS/W/42, pt. VI; TN/DS/W/37, pt. VI (January 2003).
150
 Victor Mosoti, Does Africa Need the WTO Dispute Settlement System? http://www.proses.sciences-
po.fr/documents/Mosoti_does_Africa_need_dsu.pdf at 13.
151 Id.
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views ultimately becoming the majority view or with a coherent set of principles 
developing through the dissent process.152
The LDC Group and Africa Group proposals have been jointly criticized on the 
grounds that it is already possible for panelists to dissent and that the current consensus 
approach leads to a more thorough vetting of issues than would occur if decisions were 
all seriatim.153  However, it should be noted that the African Group proposal does not 
require seriatim opinions, but rather allows joint opinions in the event of agreement.
The DSU review is ongoing so it remains to be seen whether these proposals will 
be given any currency.  However, the Appellate Body seems quite happy with its 
procedures and as such may resist suggestions that its opinions become less unified.154
Indeed, after consultations, the Appellate Body adopted a final version of the amended 
Working Procedures in October 2004, with the amendments taking effect for appeals 
initiated after January 1, 2005.  No changes were made to Rule 3.2 or to otherwise alter
the tone of disapproval towards dissents.155
This Article does not advocate a return to seriatim opinions, as suggested by the 
LDC Group, as having every jurist author an opinion seems in other jurisdictions to lead 
to excessive confusion as to what actual decisions stand for.156  And separate opinions 
152 Id.  Mosoti believes the ICJ has worked well despite dissents, a view not shared by Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann.  See PETERSMANN, supra note 6, at 61.
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should not be written solely for the sake of having each panelist’s voice represented, but 
rather when there is genuine disagreement as to approach or outcome.  Nonetheless, both 
the LDC and Africa Group proposals raise a valuable point – namely that discouraging 
separate opinions stifles the ability of panelists to raise broader policy issues that 
otherwise may not be brought to the fore at all.
3. The link between dissent and possible reforms
If dispute settlement reports reflected any true disagreements on the panels or 
among the Division, it would assist WTO Members in negotiating and implementing
necessary changes to WTO Agreements, a process that is not working well currently due 
to the weaknesses in the Organization’s political arm.  
At present, if WTO Members feel the Appellate Body has made a substantive 
error, they can respond in one of two ways.157  First, they can adopt a different 
interpretation: “the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the 
exclusive authority to adopt interpretations … of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. …
The decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the 
Members.”158  Alternatively, Members can upon the proposal of any Member, amend the 
DSU by consensus.  Such amendment “shall take effect for all Members upon approval 
by the Ministerial Conference.”159 While it is therefore possible for Members to in 
practice led to dissent and uncertainty).  Subsequently the Privy Council shifted to a system of issuing only 
unanimous opinions.  Finally, in 1966, the Privy Council again began to permit dissenting views.  See
Lynch, supra note 105, at 727.
157 See Ehlermannn, supra note 23, at 526.
158
 Art IX:2 of Marrakesh Agreement.
159 See Article X.8 of the Marrakesh Agreement.
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essence correct perceived errors made by the Appellate Body, however, the three-fourths 
majority requirement makes this quite difficult.160
In practice, the Appellate Body has been criticized in DSB meetings for some of 
its interpretations – such as whether the DSU permits the filing of amicus briefs161 –
when the proper response would be for the Members to adopt a different interpretation or 
amend the DSU.162   However, the Members have not historically taken such actions.  
Ehlermann argues that because the political arm is so ineffective, nothing should be done 
to strengthen the judicial arm (such as WTO Members giving private parties the right to 
invoke WTO law before their national courts) because this would heighten the 
imbalance.163 In this regard, more frequent use of dissents would presumably make it 
easier for the political branch to use its legislative powers to change decisions reached by 
the Appellate Body.  
Dissents would be particularly useful in reports in which panels or the Appellate 
Body interpret rules drafted by the Members.  The Members should be privy to all of the 
interpretations made by the panelists and Appellate Body. That way if there is agreement 
among the Members that the dissent had it right, they can redraft the agreement to make 
the interpretation clearer.  As it stands now, Members have no way of knowing whether 
160 The supermajority requirement makes other changes overly complicated as well, such as filling in the 
gaps in agreement provisions that have come to be recognized as ambiguous.  See, e.g., JACKSON, supra
note 6, at 75.
161 See Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 526 for a discussion of the amicus brief issue.  Other decisions that 
have attracted criticism include the Turkey – Textiles case in which the Appellate Body interpreted Article 
XXIV and India – Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, in which the Appellate Body addressed 
India’s balance of payments system.  Many feel these cases should not have been brought; however, the 
DSU does not provide the discretion to decline to hear a dispute, once it has been formally brought. As 
Ehlermann points out, neither of these cases would have been necessary if the committees called for in 
various agreements operated as proper “political filters”. The Committee on Balance-of-Payment 
Restrictions could have come to a decision on India’s import restrictions.  Likewise, the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements could have addressed the compatibility of the Europe – Turkey customs union 
with Article XXIV.  Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 524-25.
162 See Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 526.
163 See Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 527.
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panel or Appellate Body Members actually all agreed, and if they did not, on what 
grounds the disagreement lay.  Member governments already feel pressure from their 
domestic constituents to disregard decisions they perceive to be flawed; dissents in such 
cases would provide a stronger basis for Members to push for fixing the problem within 
the WTO.
C. Dissents Have Had an Impact
A final and crucial reason why dissents should no longer be discouraged in the 
WTO context is that the dissents that have occurred have had a clear impact, suggesting 
that more dissents would lead to a better, more thorough resolution of the issues. Out of 
the five panel reports featuring dissents that the Appellate Body has already reviewed, 
two were reversed at the Appellate Body level on the grounds raised in the dissent and in 
a third case the Appellate Body agreed with one of the dissent’s two points.164 These 
three cases are discussed briefly below.
1. EC – Poultry
In the EC – Poultry case, the Appellate Body report finds that the EC’s special 
safeguard provision was inconsistent with para. 282,Article 5.1(b) of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  The dissenting panelist instead found that the use of c.i.f. price alone met 
the requirements of Article 5.1(b).  On appeal, the Appellate Body reversed the panel 
with respect to its finding on Article 5.1(b).165
164
 As of April 15, 2006 the Appellate Body had not yet issued its decision in the appeal of the Zeroing 
case.
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2. U.S. – German Steel CVDs
In the US – German Steel CVDs case, the Panel found that the lack of a one
percent de minimis standard in U.S. countervailing duty law was a violation of Article 
21.3 of the SCM Agreement.  In particular, the Panel implied into Article 21.3, which 
addresses sunset reviews, the de minimis standard of one percent found in Article 11.9, 
which addresses investigations.  One panelist dissented, arguing that the lack of a de 
minimis provision in Article 21.3 was dispositive, and that under customary rules of 
treaty interpretation, the de minimis standard in Article 11.9 could not be implied to 
apply in Article 21.3.  The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding that the Article 
11.9 standard could be implied to apply to Article 21.3, and therefore followed the 
dissent rather than the majority on this point.
3. U.S. – Certain EC Products
In the U.S. – Certain EC Products case, the dispute settlement panel found that the 
United States’s increased bonding requirements violated GATT Articles II:1(a) and 
II:1(b), first sentence.  One panelist argued that the bonding requirements in question did 
not fall within the scope of GATT Articles II:1(a) or II:1(b) first sentence, but that the 
requirements did violate GATT Article XI.  The Appellate found that the panel had 
improperly linked the duties owed to the bonding requirements and that there was no 
violation of GATT Articles II:1(a) or II:1(b) first sentence.  The Appellate Body did not 
address Article XI directly but clearly did not find the bonding requirements to violate 
any GATT provisions.  As such, the Appellate Body partially agreed with the author of 
the separate opinion.   
49
Given that three of five dissents appear to have directly affected the Appellate 
Body’s decision on appeal, two of them in a way that impacted the merits significantly, it 
appears that dissents can have a significant impact at the panel level.  The sole dissent at 
the Appellate Body level has not had an obvious effect in the form of proposed 
amendments or moves to adopt a differing interpretation.  However, for the reasons 
expressed supra in Part IV, dissents at the Appellate Body level serve additional valuable 
functions.
VI. Conclusion
Squelching dissent may have boosted the legitimacy of the nascent Appellate 
Body by giving the appearance of a strong, unified membership.  However, the enduring 
legitimacy of the dispute settlement panels and Appellate Body may be damaged if, going 
forward, the pressure not to speak separately remains in place.  Dissents perform many 
valuable functions, and the WTO membership would benefit from having access to 
differing opinions when they arise on matters of significance.
It may be that many of the first cases, issues of first impression though they have 
been, have been “easy” ones.  But over time, the number of difficult cases is likely to 
increase.  And while issues of first impression may seem clear cut upon initial 
examination, later applications of the principle may reveal previously unrecognized 
complexities.
Would-be disputants have an increasingly sizable body of prior decisions that 
provide a strong point of reference as to how future disputes on similar issues are likely 
to be resolved.  Thus we can expect that disputes that would revisit issues that have 
already been adjudicated may be settled rather than resolved through the formal dispute 
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settlement process.  When the Appellate Body revisits old issues, it would be particularly 
valuable to have a record of any past disagreements regarding interpretation, scope, or 
application.  Such a record would permit – indeed require – the Appellate Body to 
reconsider the fundamental issues and the original result.166
And the disputes that are brought before dispute settlement panels will be ones 
that raise novel or difficult issues.  Likewise, cases that are clear cut will presumably be 
less likely to be appealed than cases which have more than one plausible outcome.  
Therefore, even though the panels and Appellate Body have no discretion to decline to 
hear cases, it is likely that the cases that are brought will be increasingly challenging to 
resolve.167
In addition to later panels or Members of the Appellate Body benefiting from 
access to previous dissents, WTO Members would also benefit from having serious 
differences of opinion or interpretation made transparent.  Members would then have the 
opportunity to consider the competing views and to determine whether the majority 
interpretation is the preferred outcome.  While Members have the ability to amend WTO 
Agreements to in essence overrule panel or Appellate Body reports, their impetus and 
ability to do is impaired without ready access to alternative visions of the same issue.
The DSB is still relatively new, and as such it should still be flexible enough to 
adjust to a more permissive attitude towards separate opinions.  The more time goes by, 
however, the more ingrained its practices will become and the harder it will be to effect 
166
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167 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 806-07 (1982) (noting 
that easy cases are often settled, leaving the hard cases for judicial resolution).  
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change.168  Likewise, the longer decisions stand undisturbed, the less likely future panels 
will be to revisit them.169
For all of these reasons, the Working Procedures should be amended to remove 
the negative references to writing separately.  Members should consider altering the 
terms of office for Appellate Body members to one nonrenewable term of eight years in 
order to provide them with the maximum degree of independence and to remove any 
perceived link between specific opinions and potential tenure on the Appellate Body.  But 
most importantly, it is incumbent upon the DSB and particularly the Appellate Body to 
do away with the “consensus at all costs” mentality and to recognize the harm 
suppressing dissent will cause and the benefits separate opinions can offer.
168 Kolsky, supra note 51, at 2092- 93.
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